

STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss

BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT
Location: Portland
Docket No.: BCD-CV-10-19



GWENDOLYN RICHARDS, Individually)
and as Personal Representative of the)
ESTATE OF AUSTIN RICHARDS, JEAN)
ANN NOONAN, JEFFREY RICHARDS,)
JERRY RICHARDS, and JOEL)
RICHARDS,)

Plaintiffs,)

v.)

ARMSTRONG INTERNATIONAL, INC.,)
CRANE CO., DATRON INC.)
LIQUIDATING TRUST, GOULDS)
PUMPS, INC., and THE NASH)
ENGINEERING CO.,)

Defendants)

DECISION AND ORDER
(Armstrong International, Inc.)

In this action, Plaintiffs seek to recover damages allegedly resulting from the death of Austin Richards (the Decedent) due to his exposure to asbestos during the course of his employment at the Great Northern Paper Company (Great Northern). Plaintiffs allege that as a result of exposure to asbestos insulation used with products manufactured by each of the Defendants, the Decedent contracted mesothelioma, which resulted in his death. The matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment of Defendant Armstrong International, Inc. (Armstrong).

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed, except where noted. The Decedent, Austin Richards, worked as a mason at the East Millinocket paper mill owned by Great Northern between 1950

and 1953 and between 1956 to 1987. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 4; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 4.) As a mason's helper and mason at the mill,¹ Decedent's responsibilities included the removal insulation from pipes and various pieces of equipment (including pumps, turbines, valves, boilers, and steam traps) to allow other tradesmen to do their respective jobs (such as performing internal repairs of the pump), and then to reinsulate the pipes and equipment. (Supp. S.M.F. ¶ 6; Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 6; A.S.M.F. ¶ 5; Reply S.M.F. ¶ 5.) Until the 1970s, the insulation used at the mill contained asbestos. (A.S.M.F. ¶ 10; Reply S.M.F. ¶ 10.) Removal of the insulation created a significant amount of dust. (A.S.M.F. ¶ 4; Reply S.M.F. ¶ 4.) The mixing of asbestos-containing cement used for insulation and sweeping debris from the floor also created dust. (A.S.M.F. ¶ 4; Reply S.M.F. ¶ 4.)

Armstrong manufactures steam traps. Although the parties dispute the time at which Armstrong products were present at the mill, one of Decedent's coworkers recalls that Armstrong steam traps were located at the mill. (A.S.M.F. ¶ 10; Reply S.M.F. ¶ 10.)

The Decedent was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma at age 71 and passed away on August 19, 2007. (A.S.M.F. ¶ 1; Reply S.M.F. ¶ 1.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(c), a moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact set forth in those statements and that [the] party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A party wishing to avoid summary judgment must present a prima facie case for each element of a claim or defense that is asserted. *See Reliance Nat'l Indem. v. Knowles Indus. Svcs.*, 2005 ME 29, ¶ 9, 868 A.2d

¹ The Decedent performed "brick work" on a less regular basis. (A.S.M.F. ¶ 3; Reply S.M.F. ¶ 3.)

220. At this stage, the facts in the summary judgment record are reviewed “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” *Lightfoot v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35*, 2003 ME 24, ¶ 6, 816 A.2d 63. A material fact is a fact that has “the potential to affect the outcome of the suit.” *Burdzel v. Sobus*, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573. “If material facts are disputed, the dispute must be resolved through fact-finding.” *Curtis v. Porter*, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 7, 784 A.2d 18.

A factual issue is genuine when there is sufficient supporting evidence for the claimed fact that would require a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the facts at trial. *See Inkel v. Livingston*, 2005 ME 42, ¶ 4, 869 A.2d 745. “Neither party may rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated denials, but must identify specific facts derived from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits to demonstrate either the existence or absence of an issue of fact.” *Kenny v. Dep’t of Human Svcs.*, 1999 ME 158, ¶ 3, 740 A.2d 560 (quoting *Vinick v. Comm’r*, 110 F.3d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 1997)).

B. Applicable Law

Plaintiffs’ primary causes of action against Armstrong are negligence and strict liability.² Plaintiffs allege that the use of asbestos insulation on Armstrong’s steam traps and was reasonably foreseeable, and that Armstrong was negligent in the manufacture and sale of its products in part because Armstrong failed to warn of the reasonable foreseeable dangers associated with the use of its products with asbestos-containing insulation made by third parties. As a result, the Decedent allegedly was exposed to harmful asbestos insulation, which caused Decedent to develop mesothelioma, and ultimately resulted in his death.

² In Count I of the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the negligence of each manufacturer Defendant, including Crane, caused the Decedent’s exposure to asbestos, development of mesothelioma, and ultimate death. Plaintiffs also assert strict liability for defective design and condition based on asbestos within the products and the failure to warn of the dangers of asbestos (Count I), civil conspiracy among all the defendants (Count III), gross negligence (Count IV), “aiding and abetting” among the Defendants’ negligent and intentional acts (Count V), negligence per se against all defendants based on alleged violations of state and federal law (Count VI), and loss of consortium (Count VII).

“The essential elements of a claim for negligence are duty, breach, proximate causation, and harm.” *Baker v. Farrand*, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 11, 26 A.3d 806. A plaintiff must demonstrate that “a violation of the duty to use the appropriate level of care towards another, is the legal cause of harm to” the plaintiff and that the defendant’s “conduct [was] a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” *Spickler v. York*, 566 A.2d 1385, 1390 (Me. 1993) (internal citations omitted); *see also Bonin v. Crepeau*, 2005 ME 59, ¶ 10, 873 A.2d 346 (outlining negligence cause of action for supplying a product without adequate warnings to the user); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). “Maine’s strict liability statute, [14 M.R.S. § 221 (2011)], imposes liability on manufacturers and suppliers who market defective, unreasonably dangerous products,” including liability for defects based on the failure to warn of the product’s dangers.³ *See Bernier v. Raymark Indus., Inc.*, 516 A.2d 534, 537 (Me. 1986).

As the asbestos litigation has evolved both nationally and within Maine, the level of proof necessary to establish the requisite relationship between a plaintiff’s injuries and a defendant’s product has been subject of much debate.⁴ A majority of jurisdictions have adopted the standard articulated by the court in *Lohrmann v. Pittsburg Corning Corp.*, 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986), where the court construed the “substantial factor” test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.⁵ In *Lohrmann*, the court announced and applied the “frequency-regularity-proximity test”, which requires a plaintiff to “prove more than a casual or minimum contact with the product”

³ In addition, strict liability can attach for a design defect or a defect in the manufacturing process. *See Pottle v. Up-Right, Inc.*, 628 A.2d 672, 674-75 (Me. 1993). Those theories of liability are not at issue in this case.

⁴ In their opposition to Armstrong’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs write that strict liability in Maine requires medical causation and a product nexus in order to prove the necessary link between the alleged defective product and the claimed damages. (Pls.’ Opp’n MSJ 6.) Plaintiffs also assert that this “rubric . . . is a departure from the so-called ‘frequency, regularity, and proximity test’ of *Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.*, 782 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1986).” (Pls.’ Opp’n MSJ 6.) Because the Maine Law Court has not addressed the issue in the context of asbestos litigation (Plaintiffs cite other Superior Court decisions as authority for the standard in Maine), the Court will discuss its reasoning for applying a standard other than as articulated in *Lohrmann*.

⁵ The Restatement (Second) of Torts is consistent with the causation standard in Maine. Section 431 provides in pertinent part that “[t]he actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm . . .”

that contains asbestos. *Lohrmann*, 782 F.2d at 1162. Rather, under *Lohrmann*, a plaintiff must present “evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.” *Id.* at 1162-63. *Lohrmann* suggests that the Court engage a quantitative analysis of a party’s exposure to asbestos in order to determine whether, as a matter of law, the party can prevail.

Although the Maine Law Court has not addressed the issue, at least one Justice of the Maine Superior Court has expressly rejected the *Lohrmann* standard. Justice Ellen Gorman⁶ rejected the *Lohrmann* standard “because it is entirely the jury’s function to determine if the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury and because it is not appropriate for the court to determine whether a plaintiff has proven that a defendant’s product proximately caused the harm.” *Campbell v. The H.B. Smith Co., Inc.*, Docket No. CV-04-57 at 7 (Me. Super. Ct., April 2, 2007) (Gorman, J).⁷ In rejecting the *Lohrmann* standard, Justice Gorman wrote that to establish a *prima facie* case, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) medical causation – that the plaintiff’s exposure to the defendant’s product was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury and (2) product nexus – that the defendant’s asbestos-containing product was *at the site where plaintiff worked or was present, and that the plaintiff was in proximity to that product at the time it was being used* ... a plaintiff must prove not only that the asbestos products were used at the worksite, but that the employee inhaled the asbestos from the defendant’s product.

Campbell at 5-6. (citing, 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 70 (2001)).

Insofar as under *Lohrmann* a plaintiff must prove exposure to asbestos over a sustained period of time while under the standard applied by Justice Gorman a plaintiff must only demonstrate that plaintiff was in proximity to the product at the time that it was being used, the

⁶ At the time, Justice Gorman was a member of the Maine Superior Court. Justice Gorman was subsequently appointed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.

⁷ Justice Gorman also rejected the *Lohrmann* standard for similar reasons in *Boyden v. Tri-State Packing Supply, et al.*, Docket No. CV-04-452 (Me. Super. Ct., Feb. 28, 2007).

Lohrmann standard imposes a higher threshold for claimants. The Court's decision as to the applicable standard cannot, however, be controlled by the standard's degree of difficulty. Instead, the standard must be consistent with basic principles of causation. In this regard, the Court agrees with the essence of Justice Gorman's conclusion – to require a quantitative assessment of a plaintiff's exposure to asbestos, as contemplated by *Lohrmann*, would usurp the fact finder's province. Whether a defendant's conduct caused a particular injury is at its core a question of fact. The Court perceives of no basis in law to deviate from this longstanding legal principle. The Court, therefore, concludes that in order to avoid summary judgment, in addition to producing evidence of medical causation, a plaintiff must establish the product nexus through competent evidence. In particular, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendant's product was at the defendant's work place, (2) that the defendant's product contained asbestos, (3) and that the plaintiff had personal contact with the asbestos from the defendant's product. If a plaintiff produces such evidence, which can be either direct or circumstantial, the question of whether the defendant's product was a "substantial factor" in causing the plaintiff's damages is for the jury.

Thus, to survive the motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that: (1) Armstrong's product was at Great Northern, (2) Armstrong's product at Great Northern contained asbestos, and (3) the Decedent had personal contact with asbestos from Armstrong's product. "If a plaintiff produces such evidence, which can be either direct or circumstantial, the question of whether the defendant's product was a 'substantial factor' in causing the plaintiff's damages is for the jury." *Rumery v. Garlock Sealing Techs.*, 2009 Me. Super. LEXIS 73, at *8 (Apr. 24, 2009); *see also Addy v. Jenkins, Inc.*, 2009 ME 46, ¶ 19, 969 A.2d 935 ("Proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury.").

C. Product Nexus

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Armstrong asserts that there is no admissible evidence through which Plaintiffs can prove the Decedent was exposed to asbestos from an Armstrong product. Armstrong thus challenges the product nexus between the Decedent and its products. Armstrong also contends that because any asbestos exposure by the Decedent is the result of insulation applied after manufacture of the steam trap, it cannot be liable for any exposure to asbestos from third party products.

The record reveals that the parties dispute whether there is sufficient admissible evidence to establish the presence of Armstrong's products at Great Northern. While Decedent testified at his deposition that Armstrong steam traps were present at the mill, Armstrong disputes whether the Decedent's testimony is based on personal knowledge or a summary of information received from other former Great Northern employees. (See A.S.M.F. ¶ 6; Reply S.M.F. ¶ 6.) In addition, James Cramp, a coworker of the Decedent at Great Northern, recalled seeing Armstrong steam traps at the mill, but Armstrong qualifies this statement to note that there is no time period for the recollection. (A.S.M.F. ¶ 10; Reply S.M.F. ¶ 10.) The Court does not have to resolve the parties' dispute regarding the record evidence at this stage of the proceedings. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the non-moving party, see *Lightfoot*, 2003 ME 24, ¶ 6, 816 A.2d at 65, the Plaintiffs have established the presence of Armstrong steam traps at Great Northern.

Plaintiffs, however, have not produced sufficient evidence from which a fact finder could reasonably conclude that Decedent insulated Armstrong's products with asbestos or was otherwise exposed to the products. See *Boyden*, 2007 Me. Super. LEXIS 47, at *11. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, see *Lightfoot*, 2003 ME 24, ¶ 6, 816 A.2d at


65, the Decedent's testimony at his deposition that he remembered Armstrong steam traps at the plant does not establish that he in fact insulated those steam traps with asbestos, or was otherwise exposed to asbestos that was associated with Armstrong's products. The fact that Armstrong steam traps utilized asbestos-containing gaskets during the relevant time period is insufficient to establish Armstrong's potential liability without demonstrating that the Decedent had personal contact with the steam traps. Because Armstrong's duty to warn would only arise after sufficient proof of Decedent's exposure to asbestos from Armstrong's products, Plaintiffs have not made out a prima facie case to establish negligence or any duty to warn under the law of strict liability. Accordingly, Armstrong is entitled to summary judgment.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court grants Armstrong International, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment, and enters judgment in favor of Armstrong International, Inc. on all counts of Plaintiffs' complaint.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Order into the docket by reference.

Date: 4/5/12



Justice, Maine Business & Consumer Court

Entered on the Docket: 4-6-12
Copies sent via Mail ___ Electronically ✓